Following Trump’s victory, we assess the supply/demand picture for US debt, and what it means for yields going forward.
特朗普获胜后，我们(桥水对冲基金）评估了美国债务的供需状况，以及这对未来收益率的影响。
As government deficits have risen, both in the US and globally, the impact
of government borrowing on bond yields has become an increasingly
important topic for investors. Since Trump’s election win, we have seen
even more interest in this question because the Trump administration is
widely seen as likely to increase or maintain high fiscal deficits.
随着美国和全球政府赤字的上升，政府借款对债券收益率的影响已成为投资者越来越重要的话题。自特朗普赢得大选以来，我们看到人们对这个问题的兴趣越来越大，因为人们普遍认为特朗普政府可能会增加或维持高财政赤字。
To assess the impact of large deficits on yields, it is important to look
at the total debt in the economy, not just government debt. This is because public and private debt (both as an asset and as a source of
spending) are reasonably fungible, so what matters for markets and the
economy is how much collective new credit is being created, and the
incentive and desire of investors to buy it.
要评估巨额赤字对收益率的影响，重要的是要看经济中的总债务，而不仅仅是政府债务。这是因为公共债务和私人债务（既是资产又是支出来源）是相当可替代的，因此对市场和经济来说重要的是创造了多少新的集体信贷，以及投资者购买这些信贷的动机和意愿。
In terms of how total borrowing flows through to rates, there is an economic pressure
and a pressure created by supply and demand for debt. If there is too much borrowing and spending, leading to inflation, the central bank
will raise rates, which in turn will curtail private sector borrowing.
And if there is too much aggregate borrowing relative to demand, rates
will rise as investors require a higher premium for lending out their
marginal dollar. If government spending gets high enough, it can lead to real debt problems and sharply higher bond yields because a) the government doesn’t really get squeezed out (at least not
in a timely way) by higher borrowing costs and b) there are limits to
how much private sector borrowing can decline to offset higher
government borrowing.
就总借款如何流向利率而言，存在经济压力和债务供求压力。如果借款和支出过多，导致通货膨胀，央行将提高利率，这反过来会抑制私营部门的借款。如果总借款相对于需求过多，利率将上升，因为投资者需要更高的溢价才能借出他们的边际美元。如果政府支出足够高，它可能导致真正的债务问题和债券收益率大幅上升，因为 a) 政府并没有真正被更高的借款成本挤出（至少没有及时挤出）；b) 私营部门借款为抵消更高的政府借款而减少的数额是有限的。
That doesn’t look like where we are now or where we are headed—markets look like they are reflecting more of a
balanced supply/demand picture than an excess of borrowing, inclusive of
public and private. Some of the danger signs to watch for are rates rising led by the long end, total debt levels as a share of the economy
rising, and currency weakness. The curve steepening driven by the long
end is usually a sign you may have a problem finding buyers, and as you
can see below, that is not the case today.
这看起来不像我们现在的情况或未来发展方向——市场似乎反映的是供需平衡的状况，而不是过度借贷，包括公共和私人借贷。需要注意的一些危险信号包括长期债券引领的利率上升、总债务水平占经济的比例上升以及货币疲软。长期债券推动的曲线变陡通常表明你可能难以找到买家（债券买家），但正如你在下文看到的，今天情况并非如此。
Before going into the details, the charts below highlight that, despite higher
government deficits, total borrowing is about average. High public borrowing has contributed to the need for higher rates, which have
depressed private sector borrowing. This return to normal levels of
credit creation has helped gradually drive inflation down toward target.
And in terms of supply and demand for debt, the risk premiums on the
long end look about average, with no market signs that economic or debt
limits are currently being hit. This contrasts with other times when
abnormally high total borrowing has driven yields and risk premiums up
(via higher supply, higher inflation, or both), such as during the
1980s, the GFC, or the height of COVID.
在详细介绍之前，下面的图表显示，尽管政府赤字增加，但总借款量大致处于平均水平。高额公共借款导致需要提高利率，从而抑制了私营部门的借款。信贷创造水平恢复正常有助于逐步将通胀率推低至目标水平。就债务供需而言，长期风险溢价看起来大致处于平均水平，没有市场迹象表明目前经济或债务限额已达到。这与其他时期形成了鲜明对比，当时异常高的总借款量推高了收益率和风险溢价（通过增加供应、提高通胀或两者兼而有之），例如 1980 年代、全球金融危机或新冠疫情高峰期。
As noted above, duration is one of the more globally fungible markets, so looking at the total borrowing across the developed
world is relevant. There, total borrowing is roughly average for when
the economy is healthy, while government borrowing is at highs normally
only seen in recessions.
如上所述，久期市场是全球可替代性较高的市场之一，因此查看发达国家的总借款情况是有意义的。在发达国家，总借款大致相当于经济健康时的平均水平，而政府借款则处于通常只在经济衰退时才出现的高位。
On a Level Basis, Total Debt in the Developed World, Even in the US, Is Flat or Falling
从水平上看，发达国家（甚至美国）的总债务持平或下降
These borrowing levels are instructive as to why risk premiums on borrowing
are not currently high. As the charts below show, across many developed
world economies, total debts relative to GDP are falling rather than
rising. And notably, the amount of debt that needed to be taken down
(exclusive of central bank purchases) has come down—though more
recently, central bank selling adds a bit. Pressure is put on markets
and economies when debt and spending rise faster than what the economy
can produce. Across much of the developed world, debt levels peaked in
the global financial crisis, a crisis brought on by too much private
sector borrowing relative to what the economy could handle. There was,
of course, a massive increase in money and credit in response to COVID
that pushed the level of debt higher in the short term, but more
recently, the path of stability/lower debts has resumed.
这些借贷水平说明了为什么目前借贷的风险溢价并不高。如下图所示，在许多发达经济体中，总债务占 GDP 的比例正在下降而不是上升。值得注意的是，需要削减的债务金额（不包括央行购买的债务）已经下降——尽管最近央行的抛售有所增加。当债务和支出的增长速度超过经济的生产能力时，市场和经济就会面临压力。在许多发达国家，债务水平在全球金融危机中达到顶峰，这场危机是由私营部门借贷过多而导致的，而这些借贷相对于经济的承受能力而言是过多的。当然，为了应对新冠疫情，货币和信贷大幅增加，在短期内推高了债务水平，但最近，稳定/降低债务的道路已经恢复。
Today, as we showed above, the picture is flipped, with much more public sector
borrowing than private. This equilibrium is not a problem as it relates
to markets but has led, and may continue to lead, to political issues
the longer the private sector is priced out of debt markets by the
public sector. There seems to be more concern today about how much
borrowing is too much for the public sector when, in aggregate, the
overall borrowing relative to the size of the economy is declining
across the developed world.
如今，正如我们上文所述，情况发生了逆转，公共部门的借款远多于私营部门。这种平衡与市场无关，但随着私营部门被公共部门挤出债务市场的时间越长，这种平衡已经导致并可能继续导致政治问题。如今，人们似乎更加担心公共部门借款多少才算太多，而总体而言，发达国家整体借款相对于经济规模正在下降。
The Base Case for Supply Is More of the Same: High Fiscal Deficits and Low Private Borrowing
供给的基本情况大体相同：财政赤字高企，私人借贷低迷
Starting with supply, as we showed above, the total borrowing that needs to be
taken down is not all that high relative to normal. In the US, with the
new administration likely pushing to extend the Trump tax cuts but not
expand government spending much beyond the level it is today, public
sector issuance is likely to remain roughly constant if not rise a bit
to somewhere in the range of 7-8% of GDP. And in terms of the total
supply of Treasury debt that needs to be taken down, less quantitative
tightening from the Fed is likely to be an offset to marginally higher
deficits. However, in aggregate, this remains a high level of government
borrowing, which is being cleared by higher yields that have kept down
private sector borrowing.
从供应量开始，正如我们上面所指出的，需要削减的总借款量相对于正常水平来说并没有那么高。在美国，由于新政府可能会推动延长特朗普减税政策，但不会将政府支出扩大到目前水平之上，公共部门的发行量可能会保持大致不变，甚至略微上升至 GDP 的 7-8% 左右。就需要削减的国债总供应量而言，美联储量化紧缩政策的减少可能会抵消略高的赤字。然而，总体而言，政府借款量仍然处于高位，而更高的收益率抑制了私营部门的借款量，从而抵消了政府借款量。
If the Trump administration really pushes to the point where the private sector can’t be depressed enough
to offset the higher deficit, then we will start to get problems. But we
do see constraints on fiscal spending—inflation remains a constraint on
policy makers, particularly after the impact it had on the last
campaign. And there is not much appetite, even from Republicans, for
much higher deficits. The chart below is meant to illustrate the range
of outcomes in the next few years rather than our estimate of what will
occur. The black line in the left-hand chart below shows what the
baseline of current law would produce if the current tax regime were not
rolled, and the red line is what President Trump’s proposals would look
like if they were enacted in reasonably full measure.
如果特朗普政府真的将私营部门的支出压低到无法抵消更高赤字的程度，那么我们就会开始遇到问题。但我们确实看到财政支出受到限制——通货膨胀仍然是政策制定者的制约因素，尤其是在上次竞选活动受到影响之后。即使是共和党人，也不太愿意增加赤字。下图旨在说明未来几年的一系列结果，而不是我们对将会发生什么的估计。下图左侧图表中的黑线显示了如果现行税制不推行，现行法律的基线将产生什么结果，红线是特朗普总统的提议如果得到合理全面实施将是什么样
Private sector borrowing has been depressed by much higher yields, but it saw a small pickup with the drop in yields
earlier this year. That looks to be turning as yields have risen.
Depressed private sector borrowing has been an important part of getting
to equilibrium, but now that it is already at low levels, it is
unlikely to fall a lot further. The current level of private sector
borrowing has not been lower than it is today, with the exception of
pretty severe downturns.
私营部门借贷一直受到高得多的收益率的抑制，但今年早些时候收益率下降后，私营部门借贷略有回升。随着收益率上升，这种情况似乎正在好转。私营部门借贷低迷一直是实现平衡的重要部分，但现在它已经处于较低水平，不太可能进一步下降。除了相当严重的经济衰退外，私营部门目前的借贷水平从未低于今天。
The Incentive to Buy Bonds Has Improved, Supporting Demand, Particularly from Real Money Investor
购买债券的动机有所改善，支撑了需求，尤其是来自实体投资者的需求
On the demand side, the incentive to buy bonds is higher than it has been.
We see the appetite for bonds as supported by our view that unlevered
investors generally remain under-allocated to bonds relative to
longer-term targets, and bonds are more diversifying for an equity-heavy
portfolio at these higher yields. The yield for unlevered investors,
both real and nominal, is much higher than it has been for many years.
At the same time, as US equity markets have risen, earnings yields have
fallen to the point that they are now roughly equal to bond yields. Real
yields are now at 2% in the US—a level that, before late last year,
hadn’t been seen since the mid-2000s—and high relative to much of the
rest of the developed world. US nominal yields are at levels where the
yield is attractive and diversifying relative to stocks in any growth
slowdown. Though the yield curve, which matters for levered investors,
is relatively flat, it is steepening and may steepen further if the Fed
continues to ease. Banks have not been buying many bonds and are likely
to step in more if the curve steepens and/or regulations are eased to
enable more lending.
在需求方面，购买债券的动机比以往更高。我们认为对债券的需求受到以下观点的支持：相对于长期目标，无杠杆投资者通常仍对债券配置不足，而债券在这些较高收益率下对股票为主的投资组合更具分散性。无杠杆投资者的实际收益率和名义收益率都比多年来高得多。与此同时，随着美国股市上涨，收益收益率已降至目前大致等于债券收益率的水平。美国的实际收益率目前为 2%——这一水平在去年年底之前是 2000 年代中期以来从未见过的——相对于其他大部分发达国家而言也很高。美国名义收益率处于一个水平，在任何增长放缓的情况下，收益率相对于股票而言都是有吸引力的，并且具有分散性。尽管对杠杆投资者来说很重要的收益率曲线相对平坦，但它正在变陡，如果美联储继续放松政策，可能会进一步变陡。银行此前购买的债券并不多，如果曲线变陡和/或监管放松以提供更多贷款，银行可能会加大购买力度。
Bond market pricing looks consistent with pretty high and stable government borrowing, pretty low and stable private
sector borrowing, and not much pressure on risk premiums. Market pricing of the Fed’s terminal rate has come in substantially over the
past six weeks, and the Fed is no longer priced to bring rates down to
its definition of neutral. With yields near cyclical highs and markets
discounting that the terminal policy rate will remain in restrictive
territory, markets are signaling that the economy is strong and the Fed
doesn’t need to generate a credit response. Most of the sell-off in long
rates since September has come through real yields, while 10-year
breakevens have remained relatively stable (ticking up only modestly).
Breakeven inflation remaining around target is consistent with markets
pricing a continually subdued private sector. Though markets are
discounting some bounce in near-term inflation, much of that can be
chalked up to the Trump administration’s tariffs rather than markets
discounting a sustainably higher level of inflation.
债券市场定价看起来与政府借款相当高且稳定、私营部门借款相当低且稳定以及风险溢价压力不大相一致。过去六周，美联储终端利率的市场定价大幅上升，美联储不再将利率降至中性定义。随着收益率接近周期性高点，市场认为终端政策利率将保持在限制性区域，市场发出信号，表明经济强劲，美联储不需要做出信贷反应。自9月以来，长期利率的大部分抛售都来自实际收益率，而10年期盈亏平衡利率保持相对稳定（仅小幅上涨）。盈亏平衡通胀保持在目标附近，与市场对持续低迷的私营部门的定价相一致。尽管市场正在低估近期通胀的一些反弹，但其中大部分可以归因于特朗普政府的关税，而不是市场低估持续更高的通胀水平。
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