BILATERAL AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR A RECONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT FUND
建立重建投资基金条款和条件的双边协议
WHEREAS the United States of America has provided significant financial and
material support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion of
Ukraine in February 2022;
鉴于自 2022 年 2 月俄罗斯全面入侵乌克兰以来，美国向乌克兰提供了大量财政和物质支持；
WHEREAS the American people desire to invest alongside Ukraine in a free, sovereign and secure Ukraine;
鉴于美国人民希望与乌克兰共同投资建立一个自由、主权和安全的乌克兰；
WHEREAS the United States of America and Ukraine desire a lasting peace in
Ukraine and a durable partnership between their two peoples and
governments;
鉴于美利坚合众国和乌克兰希望乌克兰实现持久和平并建立两国人民和政府之间持久的伙伴关系；
WHEREAS the United States of America and Ukraine recognize the contribution
that Ukraine has made to strengthening international peace and security
by voluntarily abandoning the world's third largest arsenal of nuclear
weapons;
鉴于美利坚合众国和乌克兰承认乌克兰自愿放弃世界第三大核武器库为加强国际和平与安全所做的贡献；
WHEREAS the United States of America and Ukraine wish to ensure that those
States and other persons that have acted adversely to Ukraine in the
conflict do not benefit from the reconstruction of Ukraine following a
lasting peace;
鉴于美利坚合众国和乌克兰希望确保那些在冲突中对乌克兰采取不利行动的国家和其他人士不会从乌克兰实现持久和平后的重建中受益；
NOW, THEREFORE, the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Ukraine (each, a "Participant") hereby enter into this
Bilateral Agreement Establishing Terms and Conditions for a
Reconstruction Investment Fund to deepen the partnership between the
United States of America and Ukraine, as set forth herein.
因此，现，美利坚合众国政府和乌克兰政府（各为“参与者”）特此达成本双边协议，建立重建投资基金的条款和条件，以深化美利坚合众国和乌克兰之间的伙伴关系，如本协议所述。
- The Governments of Ukraine and the United States of America, with the aim
of achieving lasting peace in Ukraine, intend to establish a
Reconstruction Investment Fund (Fund), partnering in the Fund through
joint ownership, to be further defined in the Fund Agreement. Joint
ownership will take into consideration the actual contributions of the
Participants as defined in Sections 3 and 4. The Fund will be jointly
managed by representatives of the Government of Ukraine and the
Government of the United States of America. More detailed terms
pertaining to the Fund’s governance and operation will be set forth in a
subsequent agreement (the Fund Agreement) to be negotiated promptly
after the conclusion of this Bilateral Agreement. The maximum percentage
of ownership of the Fund’s equity and financial interests to be held by
the Government of the United States of America and the decision-making
authority of the representatives of the Government of the United States
of America will be to the extent permissible under applicable United
States laws.
为实现乌克兰的持久和平，乌克兰政府和美利坚合众国政府打算建立重建投资基金（基金），通过共同所有权合作管理该基金，这将在基金协议中进一步定义。共同所有权将考虑第 3 和第 4
节中定义的参与者的实际贡献。该基金将由乌克兰政府和美利坚合众国政府的代表共同管理。有关该基金治理和运营的更详细条款将在本双边协议签订后立即谈判的后续协议（基金协议）中规定。美利坚合众国政府持有的基金股权和财务利益的最大所有权百分比以及美利坚合众国政府代表的决策权将在适用的美国法律允许的范围内。 - Neither Participant will sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of, directly or
indirectly, any portion of its interest in the Fund without the prior
written consent of the other Participant. The Fund will collect and
reinvest revenues contributed to the Fund, minus expenses incurred by
the Fund, and will earn income from the future monetization of all
relevant Ukrainian Government-owned natural resource assets (whether
owned directly or indirectly by the Ukrainian Government), as defined in
Section 3
未经另一方事先书面同意，任何一方均不得直接或间接出售、转让或以其他方式处置其在基金中的任何权益。基金将收取并再投资基金的收入（减去基金产生的费用），并将从所有相关乌克兰政府拥有的自然资源资产（无论由乌克兰政府直接拥有还是间接拥有）的未来货币化中获得收入，定义见第 3 条 - The Government of Ukraine will contribute to the Fund 50 percent of all
revenues earned from the future monetization of all relevant Ukrainian
Government-owned natural resource assets (whether owned directly or
indirectly by the Ukrainian Government), defined as deposits of
minerals, hydrocarbons, oil, natural gas, and other extractable
materials, and other infrastructure relevant to natural resource assets
(such as liquified natural gas terminals and port infrastructure) as
agreed by both Participants, as may be further described in the Fund
Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, such future sources of revenues
do not include the current sources of revenues which are already part of
the general budget revenues of Ukraine. Timeline, scope and
sustainability of contributions will be further defined in the Fund
Agreement.
乌克兰政府将向基金贡献所有乌克兰政府拥有的自然资源资产（无论乌克兰政府直接或间接拥有）未来货币化所得收入的
50%，这些资产包括矿产、碳氢化合物、石油、天然气和其他可开采材料的矿藏，以及与自然资源资产相关的其他基础设施（如液化天然气码头和港口基础设施），具体内容由双方同意，基金协议中可能进一步说明。为避免疑问，此类未来收入来源不包括已属于乌克兰一般预算收入的现有收入来源。基金协议将进一步规定贡献的时间表、范围和可持续性。
The Fund, in its sole discretion, may credit or return to the Government of
Ukraine actual expenses incurred by the newly developed projects from
which the Fund receives revenues.
该基金可自行决定将基金从中获取收入的新开发项目所产生的实际支出记入或退还给乌克兰政府。
Contributions made to the Fund will be reinvested at least annually in Ukraine to
promote the safety, security and prosperity of Ukraine, to be further
defined in the Fund Agreement. The Fund Agreement will also provide for
future distributions.
基金的捐款将至少每年在乌克兰重新投资一次，以促进乌克兰的安全、保障和繁荣，这将在基金协议中进一步规定。基金协议还将规定未来的分配。
4. Subject to applicable United States law, the Government of the United
States of America will maintain a long-term financial commitment to the
development of a stable and economically prosperous Ukraine. Further
contributions may be comprised of funds, financial instruments, and
other tangible and intangible assets critical for the reconstruction of
Ukraine.4. 根据适用的美国法律，美国政府将长期致力于发展稳定和经济繁荣的乌克兰。进一步的捐助可能包括资金、金融工具以及对乌克兰重建至关重要的其他有形和无形资产。
5. The Fund's investment process will be designed so as to invest in
projects in Ukraine and attract investments to increase the development,
processing and monetization of all public and private Ukrainian assets
including, but not limited to, deposits of minerals, hydrocarbons, oil,
natural gas, and other extractable materials, infrastructure, ports, and
state-owned enterprises as may be further described in the Fund
Agreement. The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Ukraine intend that the investment process will lead to
opportunities for distribution of additional funds and greater
reinvestment, to ensure the sufficient supply of capital for the
reconstruction of Ukraine as set out in the Fund Agreement.
5.
基金的投资流程将旨在投资乌克兰的项目并吸引投资，以增加乌克兰所有公共和私人资产的开发、加工和货币化，包括但不限于矿产、碳氢化合物、石油、天然气和其他可开采材料、基础设施、港口和国有企业的储量，基金协议中可能进一步描述。美利坚合众国政府和乌克兰政府希望投资流程将带来分配额外资金和增加再投资的机会，以确保为基金协议中规定的乌克兰重建提供足够的资金。
The Participants reserve the right to take such action as necessary to
protect and maximize the value of their economic interests in the Fund.
参加方保留采取必要行动的权利，以保护并最大化其在基金中的经济利益的价值。
6. The Fund Agreement will include appropriate representations and
warranties, including those necessary to ensure that any obligations the
Government of Ukraine may have to third parties, or such obligations
that it may undertake in the future, do not sell, convey, transfer
pledge, or otherwise encumber the Government of Ukraine’s contributions
to the Fund or the assets from which such contributions are derived, or
the Fund’s disposition of funds.
6. 基金协议将包括适当的陈述和保证，包括确保乌克兰政府对第三方可能承担的任何义务或其将来可能承担的义务不会出售、转让、转移质押或以其他方式妨碍乌克兰政府对基金的捐款或此类捐款所源自的资产，或基金对资金的处置所必需的陈述和保证。
In drafting the Fund Agreement, the Participants will strive to avoid
conflicts with Ukraine’s obligations under its accession to the European
Union or its obligations under arrangements with international
financial institutions and other official creditors.
在起草基金协议时，参与方将努力避免与乌克兰加入欧盟时承担的义务以及与国际金融机构和其他官方债权人安排下的义务相冲突。
7. The Fund Agreement will provide, inter alia, an acknowledgment that
both the Fund Agreement and the activities provided for therein are
commercial in nature.
7. 基金协议将除其他外，承认基金协议及其规定的活动均属商业性质。
The Fund Agreement shall be ratified by the Parliament of Ukraine according
to the Law of Ukraine "On International Treaties of Ukraine".
该基金协议须根据乌克兰《关于乌克兰国际条约的法律》由乌克兰议会批准。
8. The Fund Agreement will pay particular attention to the control
mechanisms that make it impossible to weaken, violate or circumvent
sanctions and other restrictive measures.
8.基金协议将特别重视控制机制，使削弱、违反或规避制裁和其他限制措施变得不可能。
9. The text of the Fund Agreement will be developed without delay by
working groups chaired by authorized representatives of the Government
of Ukraine and the Government of the United States of America. Contact
persons responsible for preparing the Fund Agreement on the basis of
this Bilateral Agreement are: from the Government of the United States
of America: the Department of the Treasury; from the Government of
Ukraine: Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economy.
9. 基金协议文本将由乌克兰政府和美利坚合众国政府授权代表主持的工作组立即制定。负责根据本双边协议制定基金协议的联系人为：美利坚合众国政府：财政部；乌克兰政府：财政部和经济部。
10. This Bilateral Agreement and the Fund Agreement will constitute
integral elements of the architecture of bilateral and multilateral
agreements, as well as concrete steps to establish lasting peace, and to
strengthen economic security resilience and reflect the objectives set
forth in the preamble to this Bilateral Agreement.
10.本双边协定和基金协定将构成双边和多边协定架构的组成部分，以及建立持久和平、增强经济安全韧性的具体步骤，并体现本双边协定序言中提出的目标。
The Government of the United States of America supports Ukraine’s efforts
to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace.
Participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual
investments, as defined in the Fund Agreement.
美国政府支持乌克兰为获得建立持久和平所需的安全保障所做的努力。参与者将寻求确定任何必要措施来保护《基金协议》中规定的共同投资。
11. This Bilateral Agreement is binding and will be implemented by each
Participant according to its domestic procedures. The Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Ukraine commit to proceed
forthwith to negotiate the Fund Agreement.
11. 本双边协议具有约束力，各参与方应按照国内程序予以实施。美利坚合众国政府和乌克兰政府承诺立即启动基金协议谈判。
Signed in English and Ukrainian languages, both texts are equally authentic. 该协议以英文和乌克兰文签署，两种文本具有同等效力。
For the Government of the United States of America:
Scott K. H. Bessent
Secretary of the Treasury
For the Government of Ukraine:
Yuliia Svyrydenko
First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine – Minister of Economy of Ukraine
Breaking Down the U.S.-Ukraine Minerals DealPortions of this critical questions analysis were previously published in a CSIS Critical Minerals article on February 21, 2025.U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have
reached a bilateral agreement for the United States to jointly invest in
Ukraine’s critical minerals and other valuable resources. While the
framework leaves many details to be worked out, this is the first
agreement of its kind. As additional countries, such as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, seek a similar deal, understanding the terms of
the Ukraine deal and its likely efficacy has important implications for
U.S. mineral security.Q1: What are the terms of the U.S.-Ukraine minerals deal?A1: The bilateral agreement is markedly different from the original
minerals deal proposed by the Trump administration. The initial deal
called for Ukraine to use its mineral resources to repay the United
States $500 billion for military aid previously provided. The agreed
upon framework does not designate the rights of $500 billion worth of
minerals revenues to the United States nor does it include a security
guarantee for Ukraine. Rather, the agreement establishes a
reconstruction investment fund with joint U.S. and Ukraine ownership.
Ukraine will contribute 50 percent of all revenues earned from the
future monetization of all Ukrainian government-owned natural resource
assets into the fund. This includes minerals deposits, oil, natural gas,
and other relevant infrastructure, but, notably, it does not include
resources that are already serving as a revenue source to Ukraine, such
as the operations of Naftogaz and Ukrnafta, Ukraine’s largest oil and
gas producers. This means, the profitability of the fund is entirely
dependent on the success of new investments in Ukraine’s resources.Contributions to the fund will be reinvested into projects in Ukraine to further
develop assets including mineral deposits, oil, natural gas,
infrastructure, and ports. These projects will need to be further
defined in the final fund agreement. These investments from the fund
intend to spur further private sector interest in investing in Ukraine’s
resources and attract the necessary capital for Ukraine’s
reconstruction and development of resources. Therefore, the response of
private industry is key to the success of the fund and will determine
how much value the United States ultimately derives.The agreement includes little to guarantee Ukraine’s security or reaffirm
U.S. financial and military support in the ongoing conflict. However,
the idea is that with joint U.S.-Ukraine investment in the nation’s
resources, the United States will continue to have a stake in Ukraine’s
security, stability, and lasting peace and therefore be incentivized to
uphold and defend Ukrainian security. President Zelensky is expected to
meet with President Trump in Washington on Friday to sign the agreement.Q2: How likely is the bilateral agreement to move the needle on U.S. minerals security?A2: Mining is a long-term effort—so the United States may not yield
benefits for another 20 years. Ukraine still needs to undertake a
comprehensive geological mapping. From the time reserves have been
identified, globally, it takes an average of 18 years to develop a mine
and costs $500 million and $1 billion to build a mine and separation
plant.Even in the long-term, the success of the bilateral agreement ultimately hinges on
the ability of Ukraine to attract private investment in its mineral
resources. The U.S. government cannot command private companies to mine
in Ukraine as China and Russia can with their state-owned enterprises.
While government-to-government agreements can be a helpful market signal
to the private sector and spur investments that may otherwise not
occur, the barriers to investment in Ukraine pose immense challenges
that the bilateral agreement will be unlikely to surmount with
additional financial and/or security resources. Namely, challenges with
the lack of reliable reserve data to confirm economic viability, the
loss of key infrastructure, and the ongoing security risks in the region
jeopardize the viability of long-term minerals investments.First, there is very limited data on whether Ukraine’s rare earth elements and
other strategic materials are commercially viable to mine. According to
the former director general of the Ukrainian Geological Survey, there
is no modern assessment of rare earth reserves in Ukraine. Existing
mapping was done 30–60 years ago by the Soviet Union and relies on old
exploration methods. Considerations that impact the commercial
feasibility of mining deposits include depth, ore grade, byproducts, and
location. Without confirmation of this data, mining companies are
unlikely to risk investing hundreds of millions of dollars in
potentially unviable deposits.Second, the war has wiped out essential infrastructure. Mining is among the
most energy-intensive industries worldwide. It accounts for
approximately 38 percent of global industrial energy use and around 15
percent of total electricity consumption globally. Between 2022 and
2023, nearly half of Ukraine’s power generation capacity was either
occupied by Russian forces, destroyed, or damaged, while about half of
the country’s large network substations sustained damage from missile
and drone strikes. As a result, Ukraine has been left with only about
one-third of its prewar power capacity. There will need to be a
significant buildout of energy infrastructure for mineral exploration or
production to commence.Lastly, mining companies are reluctant to make long-term investments due to the
ongoing security risk in Ukraine. The absence of security assurances in
the bilateral agreement further complicates the situation. A new mine
can run for over 50 years. Confidence in the political and economic
stability of a jurisdiction is critical given the size and longevity of
the investment. While Trump, Putin, and Zelensky may reach a peace deal,
threat of further conflict and land expropriation will loom given the
long-standing nature of the conflict. The Russia-Ukraine war, the
deadliest conflict in Europe since World War II, started 11 years ago.
After Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution, Russian forces took control of Crimea
in early 2014. Russia later engaged in the conflict in the Donbas,
leading to Russian and Russian-backed forces occupying parts of Donetsk
and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine. Putin has announced that he’s willing to
enter into his own minerals agreement negotiations for minerals not
only located in Russia but also on Russia-occupied land.Q3: What does the agreement signify for Trump’s approach to minerals diplomacy?A3: Trump’s determination to secure Ukraine’s mineral resources has
cemented critical minerals as a focal point in the administration’s
foreign policy. As the Trump administration approaches international
diplomacy with a more transactional lens, critical mineral resources are
bound to be a part of the conversation. The administration’s emphasis
on securing critical minerals is positive, but bilateral minerals
agreements should be made with good geological data and the needs of the
private sector in mind.The Ukraine agreement may be the first minerals deal of its kind, but it
will likely not be the last the Trump administration negotiates.
Already, Trump has shown interest in accessing minerals from Greenland,
Canada, and even Russia. The U.S. government needs a measured,
data-backed approach to working with partner nations to facilitate
strategic investments. This approach relies on significant
private-sector buy-in.Q4: What do these developments mean for U.S.-Ukraine relations under Trump,
and what are the implications for the future of Ukraine and NATO
security?A4: Trump has consistently vocalized throughout his campaign run and first few weeks
in office that he would be taking a different approach to the
Russia-Ukraine conflict compared to the Biden administration over the
last three years. While the Biden administration aimed to isolate Russia
on the international stage via tightening sanctions, Trump has opened
diplomatic doors to Moscow with a 90-minute phone call weeks into his
second term, high-level in-person talks with representatives from the
administration, and a tentative meeting between President Trump and
President Putin in Saudi Arabia in the near future. Additionally, while
Biden consistently prioritized arming and aiding Ukraine, Trump has
taken a more transactional approach and questioned the utility of
continuing to bolster Ukraine financially and militarily.Tensions have risen considerably between Trump and Zelensky, as critical mineral
resource access is the latest arena for Trump to focus his
transactional methods of diplomacy. But the viability of the deal
remains to be seen as tensions continue to rise between the two world
leaders. Trump seemingly blamed Ukraine for starting the war with Russia
and called Zelensky a “dictator without elections.” Meanwhile,
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has said U.S. troops would not be
deployed to Ukraine as part of any security guarantees for the country.Under the Trump administration, Ukraine, Europe, and NATO as a whole are
likely to face a great decline in security guarantees from the United
States without offering strategic resources or financial compensation in
return.Q5: What should the U.S. government be doing to encourage private investment in
challenging international markets such as Ukraine?A5: While the security environment in Ukraine may not currently be apt for
large private investments in resource development, the U.S. government
is right to be looking at what it can do to encourage investments in
jurisdictions abroad that are mineral rich but challenging to access due
to the elevated risks for investors. There are concrete policy and
bureaucratic changes the United States can make to better support and
mitigate risks for private industry making strategic investments abroad.Firstly, the United States should boost funding and expand the capabilities of
the U.S. Geological Survey to carry out geological mapping and minimize
exploration risks in critical areas. Second, the United States needs to
support strategic infrastructure development in key jurisdictions.
Globally, the United States offers multiple avenues for funding
international infrastructure projects, including the Development Finance
Corporation and Power Africa. And third, the U.S. government should use
targeted financial incentives for Western companies to be able to
compete against adversaries in high-risk mining jurisdictions.
Successful minerals diplomacy will necessitate the use of an arsenal of
U.S. policy tools, tax credits, loan guarantees, and price support
mechanisms, which are all tools that can be leveraged to make U.S.
mineral projects more competitive against heavily subsidized Chinese
competitors.Gracelin Baskaran is the director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington,
D.C. Meredith Schwartz is a research associate for the Critical
Minerals Security Program at CSIS.Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on
international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and
nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions.
Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this
publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).© 2025 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.翻译：
我将把这篇文章翻译成通顺的中文。
解析美国-乌克兰矿产协议
本篇关键问题分析的部分内容曾于2025年2月21日发表在CSIS关键矿产文章中。
美国总统唐纳德·特朗普和乌克兰总统沃洛德米尔·泽连斯基已达成双边协议，美国将共同投资乌克兰的关键矿产和其他宝贵资源。虽然该框架还有许多细节需要完善，但这是首个此类协议。随着刚果民主共和国等其他国家寻求类似协议，理解乌克兰协议的条款及其可能的有效性对美国矿产安全具有重要意义。
问题1：美国-乌克兰矿产协议的条款是什么？
答1：此双边协议与特朗普政府最初提出的矿产协议明显不同。最初的协议要求乌克兰使用其矿产资源向美国偿还此前提供的5000亿美元军事援助。达成的框架既没有指定将价值5000亿美元的矿产收入权利给美国，也没有为乌克兰提供安全保障。相反，该协议建立了一个由美国和乌克兰共同拥有的重建投资基金。乌克兰将把所有乌克兰政府拥有的自然资源资产未来货币化所获得的所有收入的50%贡献给该基金。这包括矿产储量、石油、天然气和其他相关基础设施，但值得注意的是，不包括已经作为乌克兰收入来源的资源，如乌克兰最大的石油和天然气生产商Naftogaz和Ukrnafta的运营。这意味着，基金的盈利能力完全取决于乌克兰资源新投资的成功与否。
基金的贡献将再投资于乌克兰的项目，以进一步开发包括矿产储量、石油、天然气、基础设施和港口在内的资产。这些项目需要在最终基金协议中进一步明确。基金的这些投资旨在激发私营部门对投资乌克兰资源的进一步兴趣，并吸引乌克兰重建和资源开发所需的资金。因此，私营企业的响应是基金成功的关键，也将决定美国最终获得多大价值。
该协议几乎没有保证乌克兰的安全或重申美国在持续冲突中的财政和军事支持。然而，其理念是，随着美国与乌克兰共同投资该国资源，美国将继续在乌克兰的安全、稳定和持久和平中拥有利益，因此会被激励维护和捍卫乌克兰安全。泽连斯基总统预计将于周五在华盛顿与特朗普总统会面签署协议。
问题2：双边协议对提升美国矿产安全的可能性有多大？
答2：采矿是一项长期努力——因此美国可能需要20年后才能获益。乌克兰仍需进行全面的地质测绘。从确定储量开始，全球平均需要18年才能开发一座矿山，建造一座矿山和分离工厂的成本在5亿至10亿美元之间。
即使在长期，双边协议的成功最终取决于乌克兰吸引私人投资其矿产资源的能力。美国政府不能像中国和俄罗斯那样命令私营企业在乌克兰开采矿产。虽然政府间协议可以成为对私营部门的有益市场信号，并刺激可能不会发生的投资，但乌克兰投资面临的障碍带来巨大挑战，双边协议不太可能仅靠额外的财政和/或安全资源来克服这些挑战。即，缺乏可靠的储量数据来确认经济可行性、关键基础设施的损失以及该地区持续的安全风险都危及长期矿产投资的可行性。
首先，关于乌克兰的稀土元素和其他战略材料是否具有商业开采价值的数据非常有限。据乌克兰地质调查局前局长所说，乌克兰没有对稀土储量进行现代评估。现有的测绘是30-60年前由苏联完成的，依赖于旧的勘探方法。影响矿床开采商业可行性的考虑因素包括深度、矿石品位、副产品和位置。如果没有这些数据的确认，采矿公司不太可能冒险投资数亿美元于潜在不可行的矿床。
其次，战争已摧毁了必要的基础设施。采矿是全球最能源密集型的产业之一。它占全球工业能源使用的约38%和全球总电力消耗的约15%。2022年至2023年间，乌克兰近一半的发电能力被俄罗斯军队占领、摧毁或损坏，而约一半的大型网络变电站遭受导弹和无人机袭击的损害。因此，乌克兰仅剩下战前电力能力的约三分之一。矿产勘探或生产开始前，需要大量建设能源基础设施。
最后，由于乌克兰持续的安全风险，采矿公司不愿做长期投资。双边协议中缺乏安全保障进一步使情况复杂化。一座新矿可运营超过50年。考虑到投资规模和持续时间，对一个司法管辖区的政治和经济稳定性的信心至关重要。虽然特朗普、普京和泽连斯基可能达成和平协议，但考虑到冲突的长期性质，进一步冲突和土地征用的威胁将会笼罩。俄罗斯-乌克兰战争是自二战以来欧洲最致命的冲突，始于11年前。乌克兰迈丹革命后，俄罗斯军队于2014年初控制了克里米亚。俄罗斯后来参与了顿巴斯的冲突，导致俄罗斯和俄罗斯支持的军队占领了乌克兰东部顿涅茨克和卢甘斯克的部分地区。普京已宣布他愿意就不仅位于俄罗斯而且位于俄罗斯占领土地上的矿产进行自己的矿产协议谈判。
问题3：该协议对特朗普的矿产外交方式意味着什么？
答3：特朗普确保获取乌克兰矿产资源的决心已将关键矿产确立为该政府外交政策的焦点。随着特朗普政府以更具交易性的视角处理国际外交，关键矿产资源必将成为对话的一部分。政府对确保关键矿产的强调是积极的，但双边矿产协议应在掌握良好地质数据和考虑私营部门需求的基础上制定。
乌克兰协议可能是首个此类矿产协议，但它不太可能是特朗普政府谈判的最后一个。特朗普已经表现出对获取格陵兰岛、加拿大甚至俄罗斯矿产的兴趣。美国政府需要一种经过深思熟虑、基于数据的方法来与伙伴国家合作促进战略投资。这种方法依赖于私营部门的大量参与。
问题4：这些发展对特朗普领导下的美乌关系意味着什么，以及对乌克兰和北约安全未来有何影响？